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THE TROUBLE WITH TORGERSON: THE
LATEST EFFORT TO SUMMARILY
ADJUDICATE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES
Theresa M. Beiner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars have lamented the use of summary judgment by both courts
and defendants in employment discrimination cases.1 In spite of court statements that employment discrimination cases are not well suited for summary
judgment,2 summary judgment is often granted.3 Breaking its own precedent on
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Nadine Baum Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law. Professor of Law
Librarianship Jeff Woodmansee provided valuable research support for this article. This
article was supported by a research grant from the UALR Bowen School of Law. In addition,
Meghan Joiner provided helpful research assistance on this article. The title of this article is
a reference to the original Star Trek series episode entitled “The Trouble with Tribbles.”
http://www.startrek.com/database_article/trouble-with-tribbles-the. In that episode, a little
furry creature called a tribble made its way onto the Enterprise. The problem with tribbles
was that they multiplied very quickly, overtaking the ship. Like tribbles, the court’s decision
in Torgerson has taken on a life of its own, being cited positively, according to Westlaw’s
keycite function, by over 600 courts since it was decided in 2011.
1 See Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 795–96, 806–19 (2002);
Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 205–09 (1993); M.
Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311, 311–17 (1999) (discussing summary judgment in hostile
environment sexual harassment context); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of
Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 537–51 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV.
705, 709–10 (2007). A study of seven federal district courts sponsored by the American Bar
Foundation found that 18 percent of plaintiffs lost their cases on summary judgment. Laura
Beth Nielsen, Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the
Contemporary U.S., RESEARCHING L., Spring 2008, at 1, 3. Fifty percent of the cases studied
were settled early. Id. Only 2 percent of plaintiffs won at trial. Id. These cases generally
have higher rates of summary judgment and lower rates of settlement when compared to
other cases brought in the federal court system. See id. at 7.
2 See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004).
3 See, e.g., Doner-Hedrick v. N.Y. Inst. of Tech., 874 F. Supp. 2d 227, 232, 239 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (acknowledging “greater caution” in granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, while granting summary judgment for employer on Title VII claims); see
also Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1032–33 (study of summary
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this point, the Eighth Circuit recently has taken what some might call the “ultimate” step in increasing the potential for summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases. In 2011, in Torgerson v. City of Rochester,4 that court
held that “[t]here is no ‘discrimination case exception’ to the application of
summary judgment, which is a useful pretrial tool to determine whether any
case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a trial.”5
While the Torgerson court might well have been correct that there is no
“discrimination case exception” to summary judgment, federal courts have long
voiced reluctance in granting summary judgment in cases involving intent—
whether those cases involve the intentions of contracting parties, securities
fraud, or the motives of alleged conspirators in an antitrust case.6 Indeed, the
premier treatise on federal practice and procedure, Wright, Miller, and Kane,
has an entire section devoted to the difficulties in granting summary judgment
in “actions involving state of mind,”7 in which they discuss discrimination and
employment cases as part of this category.8
With the exception of disparate impact cases,9 all employment discrimination cases require a plaintiff to show the state of mind of the defendantjudgment rates for cases in 2006 showing courts granted 80 percent of summary judgment
motions in whole or in part). Employment discrimination plaintiffs win pretrial adjudications
far less often than other plaintiffs. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 103, 128 (2009) (“Over the period of 1979–2006 in federal court, employment discrimination plaintiffs have won 3.59% of pretrial adjudications, while other plaintiffs have won
21.05% of pretrial adjudications.”).
4 Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011).
5 Id. at 1043 (citing Fercello v. County of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2010)).
6 See 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2730 (3d
ed. 1998) (citing cases in these areas as examples). The other influential treatise on Federal
Practice—Moore’s Federal Practice—has noted that this once “bright-line” rule is no longer
quite so “bright” after Matsushita v. Zenith. See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 56.25[2][b] (3d ed. 2013). However, it does note that, “[n]evertheless, summary
judgment will still be difficult to obtain in many cases in which a party’s state of mind is a
material issue.” Id. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act changes the pleading
requirements in Securities Fraud Cases. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012). As a result of this
statute, with some exceptions:
in any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall,
with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). Thus, plaintiffs often lose on the pleadings in these cases. This
reform was largely in response to purportedly abusive litigation tactics used by plaintiffs’
counsel in these cases. For an overview of the history of the Act and criticism of it, see
generally Laura A. McDonald, Restoring the Balance After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 911 (2011); Neil Pandey-Jorrin, A Case for
Amending the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Why Increasing Shareholders Rights
to Sue Will Help Prevent the Next Financial Crisis and Better Inform the Investing Public,
BUS. L. BRIEF, Spring 2009, at 15–19.
7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6.
8 Id.
9 These cases do not require the plaintiff to show that the defendant had the intent to discriminate, but instead the impact alone of an employment practice is sufficient to prove
discrimination. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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employer, or of one or more of its employees.10 In addition, because actors so
rarely voice their discriminatory preferences aloud, employment discrimination
plaintiffs often rely on inferences from circumstantial evidence. Making inferences is a traditional jury function that courts have held is not well-suited for
summary judgment. Thus, the Torgerson court misapprehends those cases that
seemingly require a “special” summary judgment standard for employment discrimination cases. Rather, these cases involve a standard commonly used in
cases that involve drawing inferences in an effort to determine the defendant’s
intent.11
While other courts have adopted holdings similar to Torgerson, the circuits are in a state of confusion in assessing how intent in employment discrimination cases affects summary judgment.12 Some courts still state that
employment discrimination cases are poor candidates for summary judgment
when issues of intent are present, and in some instances, seemingly make it
easier for defendants to obtain summary judgment in employment discrimination cases than in other cases. Still other courts simply follow the summary
judgment trilogy—Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,13 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,14 and Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.15—without ever discussing how intent may play a role in the efficacy of summary
judgment. Indeed, one might assume that the Eighth Circuit and other courts
changed their analyses as a result of the summary judgment trilogy. However,
10

This is court-made doctrine and not necessitated by the language of the statute. See
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV.
741, 756–58, 761–66 (2005) (arguing that Title VII does not require an “either-or” evaluation in employment discrimination cases, but instead can be used to remedy unconscious
bias); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1995)
(noting “[i]t would be reasonable to interpret this language [in Title VII] as simply requiring
proof of causation without proof of intent”); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske,
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1004 & n.22, 1029, 1053–54 (2006) (citing scholars who
suggest same and arguing same). Title VII, among other things, makes it an unlawful
employment practice “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). What “because of” means in this context is subject to judicial interpretation. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 broadened the statute’s reach by
making such actions actionable if race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a “motivating factor.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
11 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6 (“Inasmuch as a determination of someone’s state of
mind usually entails the drawing of factual inferences as to which reasonable people might
differ—a function traditionally left to the jury—summary judgment often will be an inappropriate means of resolving an issue of this character.”).
12 See infra notes 136–44 and accompanying text.
13 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
14 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
15 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 574–75 (1986). The
Court decided these three cases in 1986, thereby reformulating the standard for summary
judgment. See Suja A. Thomas, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Keynote
Speech at the Seattle University School of Law Colloquium on the 25th Anniversary of the
Summary Judgment Trilogy: Before and After the Summary Judgment Trilogy (Sept. 16,
2011), in 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 499, 500–01 (2012).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ302.txt

676

unknown

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 4

3-JUN-14

10:37

[Vol. 14:673

Eighth Circuit case law, as well as cases from other circuits, establishing the
difficulties of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases persisted
after the trilogy, suggesting that this concept survives these cases.16
In addition, there is good reason, based on the psychology of bias, for
letting these cases get to the fact finder. Some courts’ language suggesting
reluctance to grant summary judgment in cases involving intent is consistent
with what is known about the manner in which discrimination operates. While
instances of overt discrimination are relatively rare,17 more subtle forms of
discrimination flourish. What psychology tells us about the manner in which
bias operates suggests that courts that were hesitant in deciding intent at the
summary judgment stage were not wrongheaded, in spite of what recent Eighth
Circuit case law suggests.
This article argues that the Torgerson court, and courts who decide these
cases similarly, have got it wrong as both a matter of law and policy. Case law
has long recognized the difficulties in determining intent and making inferences
from circumstantial evidence at the summary judgment stage not only in discrimination cases, but also in other cases in which intent is at issue. This is
especially true for employment discrimination cases, in which a variety of psychological theories, including heuristics and cognitive biases, by way of example, suggest that judges might have difficulty assessing employer motivations
on a motion for summary judgment. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the
judges themselves may be biased.
This article proceeds in three parts. First, this article describes how summary judgment is conceptualized in intent cases, including employment discrimination cases. This includes a brief history of summary judgment in intent
cases as well as a description of the summary judgment trilogy. Second, the
psychology of discrimination is discussed, with an eye toward what this might
mean for summary judgment in these cases. Finally, this article argues for
returning to the original cautious standard used in intent cases, which should
cause courts to pause before granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.

16

See, e.g., Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 364–65 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting
that “[s]ummary judgments should seldom be used in cases alleging employment discrimination”). The trilogy came down in 1986—a year before the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Hillebrand.
17 See Susan T. Fiske, What We Know About the Problem of the Century: Lessons from
Social Science to the Law, and Back, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 59, 59–60 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds.,
2005) (suggesting “perhaps 10%” are openly discriminatory). But see Laura Beth Nielsen &
Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH, supra, at 3, 17
(describing study showing that 33% of blacks and Hispanics reported that they were not
offered a job that went to a white person because of race discrimination and 31% reported
being passed over for a promotion that went to a white person because of discrimination).
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT CASE LAW
A. The Reasoning Behind Torgerson
The en banc Eighth Circuit court in Torgerson reversed an entire line of
cases dating back to at least 1987.18 Indeed, one of the interesting things the
court did in this case is provide an appendix of the cases—numbering sixtytwo—that it, in effect, abrogated.19 This list shows how well entrenched this
position was in the Eighth Circuit.
Torgerson involved allegations of sex and national origin discrimination
leveled at a fire department. The en banc court characterized the plaintiffs’
requested relief from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as based on a
“separate standard for these cases.” However, the standard advocated by the
plaintiffs and used by the panel that first heard the case was consistent with
Eighth Circuit precedent.20 Reasoning that “statements asserting a different
standard of review for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases
are contrary to Supreme Court precedent,” the court declared, “[t]here is no
‘discrimination case exception’ to the application of summary judgment, which
is a useful pretrial tool to determine whether any case, including one alleging
discrimination, merits a trial.”21
The Supreme Court precedent relied upon by the Torgerson court included
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing,22 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,23 and
USPS Board of Governors v. Aikens.24 The Torgerson court relied on a particular quote taken from Aikens, a 1983 case involving a race discrimination claim
made by a postal service employee. Aikens dealt with the interaction between
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case and summary judgment. The Aikens
Court held that once an employer met its burden of coming forth with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse actions, the issue that remained
was whether or not the employer did discriminate.25 The trial court, instead,
required the plaintiff to submit direct evidence of discrimination while also
focusing on the plaintiff’s prima facie case, which the Court held to be “erroneous” on appeal.26 Thus, the Court vacated a judgment in the defendant’s favor,
holding that the plaintiff did not need to submit direct evidence of
discrimination.27
In this context, the Court explained:
All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of fact in discrimination
cases is both sensitive and difficult. The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. There will
seldom be “eyewitness” testimony as to the employer’s mental processes. But none
of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination differ18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1058–60 (8th Cir. 2011).
See id.
Id. at 1043.
Id. (citing Fercello v. County of Ramsey 612 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2010)).
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993).
U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
Id. at 715.
Id. at 717.
Id.
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ently from other ultimate questions of fact. . . . The law often obliges finders of fact
to inquire into a person’s state of mind. As Lord Justice Bowen said in treating this
problem in an action for misrepresentation nearly a century ago: “The state of a
man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very
difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a particular time is, but if it can be
ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else.”28

While this quote certainly stands for the proposition that state of mind is an
issue of fact for the fact finder, it does not say much about the efficacy of
determining this at summary judgment. Indeed, the Aikens Court reversed the
lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the postal service.29 The main
point of the case concerned how McDonnell Douglas burden shifting fits into
the analysis.
The Supreme Court in both St. Mary’s and Reeves picked up on this language from Aikens. The St. Mary’s Court addressed whether a plaintiff automatically wins a case using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis if
he or she discredits the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason. The
Court concluded that it was up to the fact finder, at that point, to determine
whether or not discrimination played a role in the adverse employment action.
The fact finder was free to determine, even after the plaintiff discredited the
employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason, that discrimination was not
the cause of the adverse employment action.30 This case did not involve summary judgment; instead, it was an appeal from a bench trial.31 The Court
quoted Aikens in response to the plaintiff’s argument that the Court’s position
was problematic, given that Congress had recently amended Title VII to permit
jury trials.32 Thus, when the Court referred to Aikens, it was discussing situations involving the actual trial before a fact finder—not summary judgment.33
Indeed, the St. Mary’s Court emphasized that whether discrimination was the
cause of the employer’s action “remains a question for the factfinder to
answer.”34
Reeves, however, did arise in a context more akin to summary judgment—
an appeal from the court of appeals granting a motion for judgment as a matter
of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.35 Rule 50 motions are analo28 Id. at 716–17 (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, (1885) 29 Ch. 459 at 483 (Eng.)). Certainly, the many cases decided after Aikens suggesting caution in granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases suggest that Aikens was not seen as a case
encouraging widespread use of summary judgment in these cases. See, e.g., Crawford v.
Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Torgerson v. City of Rochester,
643 F.3d 1031, 1060 (8th Cir. 2011); see also infra notes 91–113 and accompanying text
(describing cases that suggest caution).
29 See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717.
30 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 519 (1993).
31 Id. at 505.
32 Id. at 524.
33 The Court of Appeals in St. Mary’s determined that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law once the fact finder determined that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was pretextual. Id. at 508–09. The Supreme Court disagreed with the
Court of Appeals’ analysis on this point. See id. at 509.
34 Id. at 524.
35 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000). Interestingly, the
trial court had denied the motion. Id. at 139.
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gous to summary judgment motions,36 and therefore the analysis of the Reeves
Court is more relevant to summary judgment motions. The Court in Reeves
addressed an issue that lingered after St. Mary’s; namely, whether the fact
finder can find for the plaintiff if the plaintiff discredits the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason, but does not offer additional evidence of discrimination. The Court answered this question in the affirmative: the fact finder
could find for the plaintiff based on finding the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason unfounded, but it was not compelled to do so.
The Court used Aikens for the general proposition that there might be
cases in which the plaintiff discredited the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, but the fact finder might still believe that discrimination was not
the cause of the adverse employment action.37 Citing Aikens, the Court
explained that “[t]o hold otherwise would be effectively to insulate an entire
category of employment discrimination cases from review under Rule 50, and
we have reiterated that trial courts should not ‘treat discrimination differently
from other ultimate questions of fact.’ ”38 The use of Aikens in these two cases
does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that intent is easy to determine at the
motion for summary judgment stage. In addition, even courts that take the position that intent can be difficult to determine on summary judgment still maintain that summary judgment is available in the right case.39 That some courts of
appeals continue to express reluctance in granting summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases even after St. Mary’s and Reeves suggests
that these cases did not address the issue sufficiently to resolve it.
B. The Traditional View of Summary Judgment in Cases Involving Motive
or Intent
Cases in which the Court directly addressed the efficacy of summary judgment where the defendant’s intent is at issue have historically viewed the matter differently. One of the cases courts relied on in supporting their reluctance
to grant summary judgment in cases involving motive or intent involved antitrust law. In Poller v. CBS, Inc.,40 the Supreme Court considered allegations
that CBS entered into a conspiracy to put a Milwaukee UHF channel out of
business.41 In reversing the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, the
Court explained:
36 Id. at 150. See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (“ ‘[T]h[e] standard [for granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). . . .’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986))).
37 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
38 Id. (quoting St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 524).
39 See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2004); Doner-Hedrick v.
N.Y. Inst. of Tech., 874 F. Supp. 2d 227, 239–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
40 Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962), implied overruling recognized
by Emigra Grp., LLC v. Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, LLP, 612 F. Supp. 2d 330,
344 n.38 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
41 The theory was that CBS was heavily invested in VHF stations and therefore had reason
to put competing UHF stations out of business in this market, and the United States more
generally. See id. at 466–67.
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We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust
litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands
of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the
witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the
weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute
for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of “even handed justice.”42

While the Supreme Court has not specifically overruled Poller, other courts
have acknowledged its obsolescence in the antitrust context when the purported
conspiracy makes no economic sense.43 However, it still is useful to examine
why courts have difficulty determining issues of motive and intent at the summary judgment stage.
Courts provide several reasons why issues of motive and intent are often
difficult to determine on a dry record. To begin with, in such cases, it is the
defendant who is in the unique position to describe why he or she engaged in
some act.44 Because such acts might lead to liability, there is a distinct incentive for defendants to lie, or, at least, to emphasize the most benign explanation.
Aside from the defendant’s explanation for its behavior, fact finders are
asked to make inferences from the circumstances to try to determine what actually motivated the defendant.45 Making intent determinations, though an issue
of fact, is meaningfully different than determining what factually happened,
e.g., determining whether the defendant fired the plaintiff. Fact finders must
assess credibility and draw inferences from the circumstances in intent cases.
Yet, even in the summary judgment trilogy cases described below, the Supreme
Court held firm that credibility determination and drawing inferences are
uniquely within the sphere of the fact finder—not the non-fact-finding
judge46—in assessing a motion for summary judgment.47
While the Poller case arose in the context of antitrust, courts in a variety
of contexts in which the defendant’s state of mind is at issue have shown similar reluctance to grant summary judgment. Included within these cases are
determinations as to the intent of contracting parties, state of mind in defamation cases, motives in civil rights and discrimination cases, and patent litiga42

Id. at 473 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 747–48 (3d Cir. 1996)
(recognizing abrogation by Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 468–69 (1992) in the antitrust context); Emigra Grp., LLC v. Fragomen, Del Rey,
Bernsen & Loewy, LLP, 612 F. Supp. 2d 330, 344 n.38 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (recognizing that
Poller was impliedly overruled); Ne. Educ. Television of Ohio, Inc. v. Educ. Television
Ass’n of Metro. Cleveland, 758 F. Supp. 1560, 1564–65 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (abrogation recognized in antitrust context).
44 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6 (“[I]nformation relating to state of mind generally is
within the exclusive knowledge of one of the litigants and can be evaluated only on the basis
of circumstantial evidence . . . .”).
45 See id.
46 Of course the parties can opt to have a judge as their fact finder. However, there has been
a decided rise in jury trials in these cases since the Civil Rights Act of 1991 permitted trial
by jury under Title VII. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An
Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005
WIS. L. REV. 663, 698; Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of Today’s Inequality, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 209, 218–19 (2011).
47 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
43
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tion.48 When it comes to employment cases, Wright, Miller, and Kane devote a
sub-section of their summary judgment volume to these cases, explaining:
“summary judgment often has been denied because of the presence of material
fact questions involving motive or intent.”49
It is not a great surprise, therefore, that many circuits, at least initially,
concluded that summary judgment often was inappropriate in employment discrimination cases.50 The Eighth Circuit cases reaching this conclusion used a
variety of rationales for this position. For example, in Crawford v. Runyon,
Judge Richard Arnold explained that, “[b]ecause discrimination cases often
depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should
not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference
for the nonmovant.”51 The court in Hillebrand v. M-Tron Industries, Inc., a
case from 1987, provided a slightly different explanation for reluctance in
granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases:
Summary judgments should seldom be used in cases alleging employment discrimination because of the special category in which Congress and the Supreme Court
visualized these cases. Knowing that discrimination is difficult to prove by direct
evidence, the Supreme Court has interpreted employment discrimination cases as
requiring simplified proof from a claimant in order to create an inference of discrimination and thereby establish a prima facie case.52

Perhaps this is where the Torgerson court found its “special” language. However, when read closely, these cases reveal nothing “special” about employment
discrimination cases; instead these cases are consistent with other cases involving inferences and intent. Thus, there was not a “special” rule for employment

48 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 114, 120 n.9 (1979) (state of mind in defamation cases); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6.
49 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2732.3 (citing cases in support of this).
50 See, e.g., Talanda v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 140 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998); Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 364–65 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated by Torgerson
v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1059 (8th Cir. 2011); Ballinger v. N.C. Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding summary judgment “seldom appropriate” in cases involving state of mind, such as employment discrimination cases). Indeed,
as explained below, some courts continue to be reluctant to grant summary judgment in these
cases. See, e.g., Acevedo-Parrilla v. Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc., 696 F.3d 128, 140 (1st Cir. 2012)
(“ ‘[C]ourts should exercise particular caution before granting summary judgment for
employers on such issues as pretext, motive, and intent.’ ” (quoting Santiago-Ramos v.
Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000))); Holcomb v. Iona Coll.,
521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008); Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 564
(6th Cir. 2004) (urging “caution” in granting summary judgment in retaliation context);
Delville v. Firmenich Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[I]t is worth noting
that ‘summary judgment must be granted only with caution in employment discrimination
cases’ ” and “ ‘especially those that turn on the employer’s intent.’ ” (quoting Harding v.
Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, No. 10 Civ. 3496(JPO), 2012 WL 4471543, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 21, 2012))); Hernandez v. City of Corpus Christi, 820 F. Supp. 2d 781, 800 (S.D. Tex.
2011) (“Summary judgment in employment discrimination cases is rarely appropriate.”).
51 Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Johnson v. Minn. Historical Soc’y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir. 1991), abrogated by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1059 (8th Cir. 2011)) (discrimination in Rehabilitation Act context).
52 Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 364–65.
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discrimination cases—there was a rule for cases involving inferences about
intent.53
Indeed, even the United States Supreme Court has suggested that at least
certain types of employment discrimination claims present difficult credibility
determinations that should be left to the fact finder. In Meritor v. Vinson, then
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that determinations regarding whether a
plaintiff found particular acts of sexual harassment unwelcome “present[ ] difficult problems of proof and turn[ ] largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact.”54 Interestingly, the Court decided the summary
judgment trilogy the same year that it decided Meritor. The Court decided Meritor on June 19, 1986.55 It decided Matsushita on March 26, 1986—before
Meritor.56 It decided Celotex and Anderson a week after Meritor—on June 25,
1986.57 Certainly, the Court was aware of these cases when Justice Rehnquist
rendered this decision for the majority. Yet, it still noted in Meritor that a
determination that sexual harassment is unwelcome was particularly within the
realm of the fact finder.
Meritor was decided in the context of a bench trial, so, once again, it is not
directly on point to summary judgment. However, in 1999 the Court in Hunt v.
Cromartie, a voting rights case brought under the Equal Protection clause
based on race discrimination, set out why summary judgment is difficult in
discrimination cases. The Court explained: “[o]utright admissions of impermissible racial motivation are infrequent and plaintiffs often must rely upon other
evidence. Summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion . . . is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.”58 This Court was discussing summary
judgment for the plaintiffs, the party with the burden of proof. However, courts
should approach summary judgment motions in intent cases with the same
reluctance, regardless of which party brings the motion. This does not mean
that summary judgment is never appropriate in these cases, but courts should be
sensitive to the difficulties of drawing inferences about motivation appropriately at the summary judgment stage.
C. The Summary Judgment Trilogy
One possible explanation for some circuit court shifts from caution to
embrace of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases may lie
with the summary judgment trilogy. In three landmark cases, the United States
53

See Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual Harassment, 17
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 813, 821–22 (1999) (Caution in granting summary judgment in Title
VII cases “is merely a pragmatic recognition that a defendant’s intent to discriminate is, like
any other subjective state of mind, difficult to prove directly.”).
54 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59, 68 (1986).
55 Id. at 57.
56 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
57 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986).
58 Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999). In this case, the lower court granted the
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. See id. at 545.
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Supreme Court transformed the “disfavored” summary judgment motion59 to
one of the principal motions that helps clear court dockets.60 Known as the
“summary judgment trilogy,”61 these cases moved summary judgment from a
disfavored motion62 to a mainstay in an employment-discrimination defendant’s arsenal.63 However, none of the trilogy cases arose in the context of
employment discrimination. Celotex was a tort case;64 Anderson was a libel
case;65 and Matsushita was an antitrust case.66 Of these cases, Matsushita,
which arose in a context in which summary judgment is generally disfavored
because of intent, might be the most important to any discussion of the applicable standard in employment discrimination cases. Yet, there is language in all
three that has relevance to the efficacy of summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases.
The Court in Celotex addressed the burden on a party moving for summary judgment when that party did not have the burden of proof at trial. The
District of Columbia Circuit had ruled that a defendant must produce evidence
of some sort in support of its motion for summary judgment.67 The Court held
that a defendant needed only to show that there was insufficient evidence to
raise a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of the plaintiff’s
claim for the court to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant.68 The
moving party still needed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, but it did not need to do so with affidavits or other evidence that
“negates” a plaintiff’s claim.69 In the course of this ruling, the Court put its
imprimatur on summary judgment, explaining that “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather
as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ ”70 As
59

See, e.g., Unlaub Co. v. Sexton, 568 F.2d 72, 76 (8th Cir. 1977) (calling summary judgment an “extreme remedy”); Mut. Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putnam Mgmt. Co., 553 F.2d 620,
624 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting summary judgment is “disfavored” in antitrust cases involving
intent); Johnson v. Richmond Cnty., 507 F. Supp. 993, 996 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (noting that
summary judgment is “disfavored” in employment discrimination cases).
60 The Court in Celotex explained that “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded
not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as
a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action.’ ” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
61 See Thomas, supra note 15, at 500–01.
62 See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex,
477 U.S. at 327).
63 See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal
District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 886–89 (2007); Clermont & Schwab,
supra note 3, at 128. (“Of course, defendants make many more motions for summary judgment, and succeed on them more often, than do plaintiffs.”).
64 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319.
65 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 245 (1986).
66 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576 (1986).
67 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321.
68 Id. at 322–23.
69 Id. at 323.
70 Id. at 327 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
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discussed earlier, it is this endorsement of summary judgment that courts often
rely upon in granting a defendant-employer’s motion.71
In the second trilogy case, Anderson, the Court had the opportunity to
overturn the language in Poller that discussed intent cases. Citing Poller, the
plaintiff in Anderson argued that courts should “seldom if ever” grant summary
judgment when the defendant’s state of mind is at issue.72 Rather than overturning or even questioning this aspect of Poller, the Court stated that Poller
did not mean that a plaintiff could withstand a motion for summary judgment
“without offering any concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could
return a verdict in his favor and by merely asserting that the jury might, and
legally could, disbelieve the defendant’s denial of a conspiracy or of legal malice.”73 While this suggests that summary judgment would be appropriate in a
case in which a plaintiff had no evidence of conspiracy or malice, it does not
suggest disagreement with the general approach to summary judgment on
issues of intent as set out in Poller.
In addition, the Anderson Court did set out some limitations on summary
judgment. The main issue in Anderson was whether and how the standard of
proof factored into a court’s determination of a summary judgment motion.
Anderson involved a libel case brought by a public figure. In such cases, the
plaintiff must show actual malice with clear and convincing evidence in order
to bring a successful claim.74 The Court of Appeals held that the clear and
convincing evidence standard was irrelevant for purposes of determining a
summary judgment motion.75 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “the
judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden.”76 However, the Court also explicitly explained that even
in cases involving a higher burden of proof, summary judgment should not be
used to “denigrate the role of the jury.” As the Court explained:
It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing
of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Neither do we suggest that the
trial courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment or that
the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to
believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.77
71

See, e.g., Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011); Dority v.
City of Chicago, 50 F. App’x 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2002); Seely v. Runyon, 166 F.3d 348 (10th
Cir. 1998); Merriell v. Dep’t. of Transp., 22 F.3d 1095 (5th Cir. 1994).
72 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 244.
75 Id. at 247.
76 Id. at 254.
77 Id. at 255 (citation omitted). The Court cited Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co. at the end of
the quoted material. Interestingly, in Kennedy, the Court overturned summary judgment
granted for the defendant in a Fair Labor Standards Act case. In doing so, the Court noted:
“But summary procedures, however salutary where issues are clear-cut and simple, present a
treacherous record for deciding issues of far-flung import, on which this Court should draw
inferences with caution from complicated courses of legislation, contracting and practice.”
Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256–57 (1948) (footnote omitted).
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Thus, even after the trilogy cases, credibility determinations and drawing inferences—two frequently necessary fact finding components of employment discrimination cases—were still left to the jury. It is unsurprising that courts
continued to proceed with “caution” in considering summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases that involved drawing inferences about
intent.
Perhaps Matsushita, involving antitrust—an area in which the courts have
traditionally acted with caution in granting summary judgment—will provide
additional insight into summary judgment in intent cases. In this case, the Court
determined the appropriate summary judgment standard for an antitrust conspiracy case.78 While acknowledging that “[o]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion,”79 the Court went on to
explain that antitrust law itself limited the “range of permissible inferences
from ambiguous evidence” in Sherman Act Section 1 cases.80 The Court noted
that predatory pricing schemes, the alleged conspiracy in the case, are particularly nonsensical, because they require conspirators to suffer significant losses
before achieving any gains and those gains are quite speculative.81 Thus, the
Court explained that “if petitioners had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy.”82 Thus, this
holding is antitrust-specific, and not very generalizable to other types of lawsuits. As explained below, bias in employment does not operate like an antitrust
pricing conspiracy. Instead, acting on stereotypes and biases about various
groups comes quite naturally to human beings and tends to be a default
mechanism.83
D. Recent Cases Involving Employment Discrimination
It is not surprising, given the history described above, that the lower courts
are in a state of confusion, at least theoretically,84 about the proper role of
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. Several circuits still
hold to—or at least pay lip service to—the old standard and express reluctance
to grant summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. Other circuits
appear to apply a tougher standard to plaintiffs who are trying to overcome a
78

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576 (1986).
Id. at 587.
80 Id. at 588.
81 Id. at 594–95.
82 Id. at 596–97.
83 See infra notes 170–93 and accompanying text.
84 I write “theoretically,” because even in circuits that use cautionary language in this context, summary judgment is often granted for defendants. In a study of summary judgment in
six federal district courts, summary judgment was more frequently granted for defendants in
civil rights case than other categories of cases studied (which included torts, contracts, and
other). Cecil et al., supra note 63, at 886–88. This data included courts in Pennsylvania
(Third Circuit), California (Ninth Circuit), Maryland (Fourth Circuit), Louisiana (Fifth Circuit), New York (Second Circuit), and Illinois (Seventh Circuit). See id. at 877–78. My
“plaintiff-friendly” circuits include the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth. See infra notes
92–114 and accompanying text.
79
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defendant’s motion for summary judgment. And still others are simply confused, with some courts within the circuit favoring summary judgment and
others still expressing reluctance. However, regardless of what a lower court
says about the standard it is applying, defendants are often successful when
moving for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.85 Thus,
even in circuits that exercise caution, defendants frequently win summary judgment motions.86
Pretext is a key issue of fact that often is the subject of summary judgment
motions in employment discrimination cases. Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, a plaintiff can raise a prima facie case of discrimination circumstantially by showing that: (1) he or she is a member of a group protected by
Title VII or some other antidiscrimination law; (2) he or she applied for and
was qualified for the job and there was an opening; (3) he or she was not hired;
and (4) after his or her rejection, the job remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants.87 After raising such a case, the defendant has the
burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.88
Once the defendant does so, the prima facie case drops out. The burden then
shifts to the employee to show that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is
not credible, either by showing that it is not worthy of belief or that other facts
suggest that discrimination was the real motivating factor.89 At the summary
judgment stage, many cases come down to the pretext issue, namely determining if the plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pretext.90 At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff need not prove that the
employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination—he or she just needs to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue.
What follows in this section are examples of how the various circuits speak
about summary judgment in these cases.
1. Seemingly Plaintiff-Sympathetic Circuits
Courts in the Second,91 Fourth,92 Fifth,93 Sixth,94 and Ninth95 Circuits
continue to urge caution in granting summary judgment in employment dis85

See Cecil et al., supra note 63, at 886–89. This study showed that defendants won these
motions in civil rights cases between 40 and 49 percent of the time during the study period.
Id. at 887. By way of comparison, plaintiffs, who make far fewer summary judgment
motions overall than defendants, won summary judgment motions in these cases between 29
and 36 percent of the time. Id. at 888.
86 See id. at 877–78, 887.
87 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 804–05.
90 See, e.g., infra notes 101–02, 119–23, and accompanying text. Some plaintiffs lose on
summary judgment because they are unable to raise a prima facie case. This sometimes
occurs in cases in which the court requires a comparator who was treated more favorably
than the plaintiff in order to make out a prima facie case. See, e.g., Doner-Hedrick v. N.Y.
Inst. of Tech., 874 F. Supp. 2d 227, 242–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
91 Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 178 (2d Cir. 2012) (when “fact questions such
as ‘state of mind or intent are at issue,’ summary judgment ‘should be used sparingly’ ”
(quoting Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 1998))); Holcomb v. Iona
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008); Delville v. Firmenich Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“At the outset, it is worth noting that ‘summary judgment must be granted
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crimination cases. This section is titled “Seemingly Plaintiff-Sympathetic Circuits,” because several of these circuits, contrary to their cautious rhetoric with
respect to granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, are
reputed as being not so employment discrimination plaintiff friendly.96 Thus,
even though courts in these circuits may advocate circumspection in granting
summary judgment in these cases, that does not mean in actuality that they do
not do so with some frequency.
The Second Circuit provides a useful example of this approach. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Holcomb v. Iona College articulated the need
for caution in granting summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases.97 The case involved allegations of race discrimination brought by a
white associate head coach of the men’s basketball team at the college. Specifically, he alleged that the college discriminated against him because he married
an African American woman.98 In this context, the court described its approach
to summary judgment:
only with caution in employment discrimination cases, especially those that turn on the
employer’s intent.’ ” (quoting Harding v. Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, No. 10 Civ.
3496(JPO), 2012 WL 4471543, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012))).
92 The case law in the Fourth Circuit is a bit confusing. While there are cases noting that
courts should exercise caution when considering summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, see, e.g., Ballinger v. N.C. Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th
Cir. 1987); Tawwaab v. Va. Linen Serv., Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768 (D. Md. 2010); in
Darvishian v. Geren, 404 F. App’x 822, 831 (4th Cir. 2010), the Fourth Circuit cited the
Third Circuit standard from Fuentes, which is described below in section II(d)(2). Adding to
the confusion is the court’s failure to officially publish Darvishian, making it not official
precedent in the circuit, even though local rules permit it to be cited. See 4TH CIR. R. 32.1
(permitting unpublished cases decided after January 1, 2007 to be cited). Thus, Darvishian is
not binding precedent. In addition, Ballinger has been cited many times in the circuit on
headnote one, the one relevant to the caution analysis. Thus, Ballinger appears to remain
binding precedent in this circuit. See Ballinger, 815 F.2d at 1001.
93 Hayden v. First Nat’l Bank of Mount Pleasant, Tex., 595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979)
(“When dealing with employment discrimination cases, which usually necessarily involve
examining motive and intent, as in other cases which involve delving into the state of mind
of a party, granting of summary judgment is especially questionable.” (footnote omitted));
Hernandez v. City of Corpus Christi, 820 F. Supp. 2d 781, 800 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“ ‘[O]nce
an employment discrimination case devolves into nebulous questions of motivation and
intent, summary judgment upon the claims is rarely appropriate.’ ” (quoting Turco v.
Hoechst Celanese Chem. Grp., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (S.D. Tex. 1995))).
94 Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 721 (6th Cir. 2006); Singfield v. Akron
Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Courts have recognized that in
discrimination and retaliation cases, an employer’s true motivations are particularly difficult
to ascertain, thereby frequently making such factual determinations unsuitable for disposition at the summary judgment stage. . . . We agree that caution should be exercised in
granting summary judgment once a plaintiff has established a prima facie inference of retaliation through direct or circumstantial evidence.” (citation omitted)).
95 The Ninth Circuit is somewhat of a special case. It is described infra in notes 102–04 and
accompanying text.
96 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 119 (noting that lawyers describe the fourth,
fifth, and sixth circuits as “hostile to employment discrimination plaintiffs”). See also Cecil
et al., supra note 63, at 877–78, 887.
97 Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008).
98 Id. at 131–32.
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We have repeatedly expressed the need for caution about granting summary judgment to an employer in a discrimination case where, as here, the merits turn on a
dispute as to the employer’s intent. Where an employer has acted with discriminatory
intent, direct evidence of that intent will only rarely be available, so that “affidavits
and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if
believed, would show discrimination.”99

Picking up on this language, the trial court in Malena v. Victoria’s Secret
Direct, LLC explained:
“To avoid summary judgment in an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff is
not required to show that the employer’s proffered reasons were false or played no
role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only reasons and that
the prohibited factor was at least one of the ‘motivating’ factors.”100

This does not mean that the courts in the Second Circuit refuse to grant summary judgment in these cases. As the court in Feingold v. New York explained:
Although “[i]t is now beyond cavil that summary judgment may be appropriate even
in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases,” “[i]n discrimination cases
where state of mind is at issue, we affirm a grant of summary judgment in favor of an
employer sparingly because ‘careful scrutiny of the factual allegations may reveal
circumstantial evidence to support the required inference of discrimination.’ ”101

Thus, while these courts are cautious about granting summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases because of the issues of intent involved, they
will do so if necessary in appropriate cases.
The Ninth Circuit initially took a slightly different approach. The court
distinguished between cases in which the plaintiff used direct and indirect evidence to show pretext, holding that it takes “ ‘very little evidence to survive
summary judgment’ in a discrimination case” involving direct evidence.102
Indirect evidence cases, on the other hand, required pretext evidence that was
“specific” and “substantial.”103 More recently, the Ninth Circuit began to question this approach, with some courts holding that a lesser showing should suffice in circumstantial cases.104
The Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa 105 caused
the Ninth Circuit to question its initial approach. In Desert Palace, the Court
held that the plaintiff need not produce direct evidence of discrimination in
order to obtain mixed motive jury instructions.106 Instead, a strong circumstantial case could likewise create the basis for a mixed motive instruction. In
99 Id. at 137 (citations omitted) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship,
22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)).
100 Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(quoting Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 138).
101 Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (quoting
Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001); Mandell v. Cnty. of
Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 2003)).
102 EEOC v. Boeing Co., 577 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009).
103 Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998); Hotchkiss v. CSK
Auto Inc., 918 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1128 (E.D. Wash. 2013).
104 See Hotchkiss, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (citing Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union,
439 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2006); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.
2004); Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222).
105 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
106 Id. at 92.
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deciding to treat direct and circumstantial evidence the same in this instance,
the Ninth Circuit explained: “circumstantial evidence is routinely used to support criminal convictions, even though a conviction requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.”107 In addition, “ ‘[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’ ”108 In Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, the Ninth Circuit relied
on this language from Desert Palace along with its earlier decision in McGinest
v. GTE Service Corp., to “conclude that in the context of summary judgment,
Title VII does not require a disparate treatment plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to produce more, or better, evidence than a plaintiff who relies on
direct evidence.”109 The McGinest court likewise used very plaintiff-friendly
language in the summary judgment context, explaining: “[w]e have held that
‘very little[ ] evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an
employer’s motive; any indication of discriminatory motive . . . may suffice to
raise a question that can only be resolved by a fact-finder.’ ”110
Summary judgment is still available in these courts, but courts must keep
in mind the difficulties associated with proving intent circumstantially.111
Thus, a plaintiff’s “conclusory allegations” of discrimination are insufficient to
defeat such a motion.112
2. Defendant-Sympathetic Circuits
Other circuits not only eschew the “caution” standard, but also go one step
further by placing a high burden on plaintiffs trying to prevail against a summary judgment motion. In particular, the Third,113 Eighth,114 Tenth,115 and
107

Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1030 (citing Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100).
Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100 (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 508
n.17 (1957)).
109 Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1030 (citing Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100; McGinest, 360 F.3d
at 1124). Interestingly, the Cornwell court ultimately decided that the plaintiff in that case
had raised an issue of fact under either standard. Id. at 1031.
110 McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406,
1409 (9th Cir.1996)). The District of Columbia Circuit uses the old Ninth Circuit direct
versus indirect evidence distinction. Recently, the court explained that in cases involving
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff is “generally entitle[d]” to a jury trial.
Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
111 See, e.g., Doner-Hedrick v. N.Y. Inst. of Tech., 874 F. Supp. 2d 227, 238–39 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“Summary judgment may be proper even in workplace discrimination cases, . . .
[h]owever, greater caution must be exercised in granting summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases where the employer’s intent is genuinely at issue and circumstantial
evidence may reveal an inference of discrimination.”). Courts likewise consider issues such
as the existence of a hostile environment in sexual harassment cases similarly difficult to
assess on a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d
166, 178 (2d Cir. 2012).
112 See, e.g., Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 358 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (citing Britt v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 08 CV 5356(GBD), 2011 WL 4000992, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2011)).
113 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994); Alred v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
771 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363 (D. Del. 2011).
114 Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1052 (8th Cir. 2011).
115 See, e.g., Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2010); Hinds v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2008). There is some confusion in
108
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Eleventh116 Circuits no longer invoke any type of caution in describing the
standard for granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.
One of the leading cases in the Third Circuit advocating tougher plaintiff
standards is Fuentes v. Perskie.117 The Fuentes court made clear that it is not
enough that the employer’s reason for its decision was “wrong or mistaken,”
but instead the plaintiff must “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally
find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ and hence infer ‘that the employer did not
act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’ ”118 As one district court put
it, a plaintiff must “show a defendant’s reasons are so weak, incoherent,
implausible, or inconsistent that they lack credibility.”119 Put yet another way
by another district court, “ ‘a plaintiff may satisfy this standard by demonstrating, through admissible evidence, that the employer’s articulated reason was
not merely wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the
employer’s real reason,’ ”120 or “the employer’s stated reason for termination is
so implausible that a reasonable fact-finder could not believe it.”121
So what is wrong with such a standard? After all, it will likely dispose of
many employment discrimination cases at the summary judgment stage. Instead
of treating employment discrimination cases like other cases, these circuits
the Tenth Circuit. While the Court of Appeals has followed a similar standard to that of the
Third Circuit in Fuentes, there are still lower courts that express the need for caution. See,
e.g., Stanphill v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1248–49 (W.D. Okla.
2008); Green v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1028 (D. Colo. 2006); Mayo
v. Dillard’s Dept. Stores, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 417, 421 (D. Kan. 1995). These cases might be
holdovers from earlier precedent in the circuit that did hold that summary judgment was in
appropriate in discrimination claims that turn on an employer’s intent. See, e.g., Cone v.
Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n, 14 F.3d 526, 530 (10th Cir. 1994). In addition, the Tenth
Circuit has explained that the severity or pervasiveness determination in sexual harassment
cases is “unsuited for summary judgment because it is quintessentially a question of fact.”
Hernandez v. Valley View Hosp. Ass’n, 684 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting O’Shea
v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 1999)). Perhaps sexual harassment cases and other harassment cases are in a category of their own.
116 Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1025–26 (11th Cir. 2000).
117 Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994).
118 Id. at 765 (citations omitted) (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983
F.2d 509, 531, 533 (3d Cir. 1992); Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638
(3d Cir. 1993)). Jones, 617 F.3d at 1280 (10th Circuit case using similar standard). For the
Third Circuit, this standard goes back to the Ezold case, which I would characterize as a
“bad precedent leads to bad precedent” case. See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V.
WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
28, 29 (2005). The plaintiff in Ezold had a strong case, with the trial court holding in her
favor. See also Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 427 (3d Cir. 2013) (recent case using
same standard).
119 Alred v. Eli Lilly & Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363 (D. Del. 2011). Interestingly, in Alred
the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a case involving allegations of discrimination under the ADEA, FMLA and Delaware state law. Id. at 362, 371.
120 Ashley v. Bayhealth Med. Ctr., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 544, 553 (D. Del. 2012) (citations
omitted) (quoting Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 413 (3d Cir. 1999)).
121 Ramanna v. Cnty. of Beaver, No. 05-1738, 2008 WL 4204713, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Sept.
11, 2008); see also Wildi v. Alle-Kiski Med. Ctr., 659 F. Supp. 2d 640, 669 (W.D. Pa.
2009).
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appear to make it easier to grant a defendant’s summary judgment motion than
it is in cases involving other claims. Using a standard that requires a plaintiff to
show that the defendant’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason possesses “such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions”122 appears to be a higher standard than simply raising a genuine issue of
material fact as to the credibility of the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason—the standard that Rule 56, by its language, imposes.123 While
showing “inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the employer’s
legitimate non-discriminatory reason would no doubt be one method of meeting
this burden, all a plaintiff is required by the rule to do is raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to the credibility of it.124 As one district court in Texas put it,
“[i]n the summary judgment setting, the plaintiff’s burden is not to persuade the
court that defendant’s explanation is incorrect but, rather, to raise a genuine
issue of material fact for trial.”125 Thus, it appears that these circuits are requiring more of plaintiffs in an effort to grant more summary judgment motions.
The Fuentes court also required a plaintiff to discount every reason given
by the defendant for the adverse action, explaining, “the plaintiff’s evidence
rebutting the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons must allow a factfinder
reasonably to infer that each of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory
reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate
the employment action.”126 This encourages employers to assert every potential
legitimate non-discriminatory reason they can think of, hoping that the plaintiff
cannot produce evidence showing “inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions”127 as to at least some of them. The Fuentes court buries a caveat in a
footnote, explaining: “If the defendant proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons,
and the plaintiff manages to cast substantial doubt on a fair number of them, the
plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder.”128 This is not much of a
concession. What if the employer only offers three, and the plaintiff can only
discredit two? Does this fall within the exception?
The Eleventh Circuit does not use the same language as that of the Third
and Tenth Circuits. Instead, in Chapman v. AI Transport, it simply makes clear
that there is no reason for using caution in granting summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases. Like the court in Fuentes, it does require
plaintiffs to create issues of fact as to every pretextual reason that the employer
supplies.129 However, it discusses this in terms of raising a “genuine issue of
material fact” and does not use Fuentes’s “inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions” language, which appears to raise the standard for plaintiffs.
Still, the Eleventh Circuit is quite clear that it does not believe caution is necessary, directly noting prior decisions of the circuit that so held and explaining
122

Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
124 See id.
125 Gerdin v. CEVA Freight, LLC, 908 F. Supp. 2d 821, 827 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
126 Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Accord Chapman v. AI
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024–25 (11th Cir. 2000).
127 Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765.
128 Id. at 764 n.7.
129 Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024–25.
123
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that the trend has been away from such a position.130 Relying on St. Mary’s,
the court in Chapman v. AI Transport concluded that “[n]o thumb is to be
placed on either side of the scale.”131
3. The Confused Circuits
Still, other circuits appear confused, the Seventh and First Circuits among
them. While some lower courts in these circuits espouse caution when granting
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases,132 others seem to use
a more defendant-friendly standard.133 One trial court simply used the wrong
standard for summary judgment.134 Other cases follow the summary judgment
trilogy, citing and quoting those cases for the appropriate standard for summary
judgment without any allusion to different or specific applications in employment discrimination cases.135 Talanda v. KFC Nat. Management Co. 136 is the
main Seventh Circuit case suggesting caution in approaching summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. Yet, the case is rather old, with the
court ruling dating back to 1998. In addition, the case is only cited by five other
cases for this proposition.137
The First Circuit suggests caution, but then uses the more difficult Fuentes
standard when assessing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The circuit explains: “ ‘courts must be particularly cautious about granting the
employer’s motion for summary judgment.’ ”138 Further, First Circuit case law
supports the notion that summary judgment is available if “the non-moving
party rests only upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsup130 Id. at 1025–26. The Court specifically relies on statements by the Seventh Circuit that
“[s]ummary judgment is hardly unknown, or for that matter rare, in employment discrimination cases, more than 90 percent of which are resolved before trial, . . . many of them on the
basis of summary judgment.” Id. at 1025 (second alteration in original) (quoting Wallace v.
SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997)).
131 Id. at 1026.
132 See, e.g., Talanda v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 140 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998) (“When
the case before us is a summary judgment ruling in an employment discrimination case, in
which credibility and intent are crucial issues, we review the record with heightened scrutiny.”); EEOC v. RJB Props., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 727, 739 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“[b]ecause
intent and credibility are typically crucial issues in employment discrimination cases, summary judgment must be approached with caution, and heightened scrutiny of the record is
appropriate.” (quoting EEOC v. Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 767, 783 (N.D. Ill.
2009))); Int’l Profit Assocs., 654 F. Supp. 2d at 783.
133 See, e.g., Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that it
is irrelevant that the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason was wrong).
134 In Teninty v. Geren, the court opined “[t]o avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that this proffered reason is pretextual.” Teninty v.
Geren, 776 F. Supp. 2d 725, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2011). This is the standard a plaintiff must meet
at trial, but is not the standard used at summary judgment, which only requires a plaintiff to
raise a genuine issue of material fact. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Perhaps it’s no great surprise
that the motion was granted in this case.
135 See, e.g., Dority v. City of Chi., 50 Fed. App’x 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2002).
136 Talanda, 140 F.3d 1090.
137 This is based on a citing references search of headnote 4, the headnote that addresses this
issue, on Westlaw. Id. (see Westlaw headnote #4).
138 Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Hodgens v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ported speculation.”139 The court also explained that trial courts should use
“restraint” when a plaintiff has produced more than “ ‘conclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, acrimonious invective, or rank speculation.’ ”140 When
it comes to showing pretext, “ ‘weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffer[ ]’ can give rise to an
inference of pretext”141—the same standard used by the defendant-friendly
Third Circuit. Thus, the First Circuit appears to support caution in granting
summary judgment in these cases, while also applying a very defendantfriendly standard used in the Third Circuit—hence, its status as a confused
circuit. All of these cases beg for some clarity regarding what standard courts
should be using. This is where studies about bias provide useful information.
III. PSYCHOLOGY, BIAS,

AND

JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING

There are two ways in which psychology is useful in assessing whether
courts should exercise caution in granting summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases involving intent. The first is based on studies of judges as
decision makers. Studies have shown that judges demonstrate an anti-plaintiff
bias in employment discrimination cases.142 If judges have a predisposition to
see these cases as unmeritorious, those biases could well impact their decisions
with respect to summary judgment. Second, judges act as normal human
beings. Social psychologists have studied the nature of how bias operates in
human beings. This bias not only exists in employers who make decisions
about their workers, but also in judges who are tasked with making decisions
about motions for summary judgment.143 Former federal judge Nancy Gertner
and Melissa Hart refer to this as the “two stories” that employment discrimination lawsuits tell: one involving discrimination by the employer and one involving potential discrimination by the judge.144 While there are a variety of
theories that try to account for the continuing disparate treatment of women and
people of color in the workplace,145 how these theories interact with the elusive
concept of intentional discrimination necessary for a plaintiff’s success in an
139 Alvarado v. Donahoe, 687 F.3d 453, 458 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Dennis v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 549 F.3d 851, 855–56 (1st Cir. 2008)) (retaliation case context).
140 Harrington v. Aggregate Indus.-Ne. Region, Inc., 668 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2010)).
141 Id. (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)).
142 See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919,
1966–67 (2009) (summary of plaintiff win rates in employment cases compared to other
case categories suggests “a legal system biased against employment discrimination
plaintiffs”).
143 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 783 (2001)
(“conclusions drawn from psychological research on human judgment and choice likely
apply to judges as well” and finding similar cognitive biases in a study of federal magistrate
judges).
144 Nancy Gertner & Melissa Hart, Employment Law: Implicit Bias in Employment Litigation, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 80, 80 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J.
Smith eds., 2012). This second story involves not only the bias of the judge in viewing the
facts but also the development of legal doctrine that is biased against plaintiffs. See id. at 87.
145 For an overview of evidence of the persistence of discrimination in the workplace, see
id. at 81–83.
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employment discrimination case can be difficult to discern. Nevertheless,
biases most of us have (of which we are often unaware) suggest that courts
should exercise caution when granting summary judgment.
A. Bias by Judges
One significant problem with arguing that judges should not grant summary judgment because of their own biases is that jurors are human beings too
and might well exhibit the same biases.146 Indeed, because jurors do not have
legal training, they might engage in more biased behaviors than someone who
is trained to “neutrally” apply the law. However, studies show that plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases fare better before jurors than before
judges.147 Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab have studied the success—or
more properly, the lack thereof—of employment discrimination plaintiffs in
court.148 The data is rather compelling. In a study of federal employment discrimination cases from 1979 to 2006, they found that overall plaintiff win rates
in trials before juries was 37.63 percent—a number fairly close to plaintiff win
rates in other cases.149 However, plaintiff win rates in trials before judges were
an anemic 19.62 percent.150 This is an 18 percent difference in win rates over
this period of time. Plaintiff win rates in bench trials in other cases are much
146 Indeed, studies of jurors show that they employ a variety of heuristics that can lead to
errors. See Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046, 1047 (1989) (reviewing jury studies).
147 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 130; In her study of 102 jury trial and ten
bench trial outcomes in employment discrimination cases, Wendy Parker disturbingly found
that plaintiff win rates before juries varied by the race of the plaintiff, with African American
and Latino plaintiffs less likely to win. Parker, supra note 46, at 228–29 & fig.2.
148 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 110 display 2, 111–12 (noting defendants’
reversal rate on appeal for exceeds that of plaintiffs); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in
the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 947, 947, 958. See generally Kevin M. Clermont et al., How EmploymentDiscrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 547 (2003). The difference in reversal rates on appeal is stark. Reversal rates for defendants from plaintiff pretrial wins is 30 percent compared to an 11 percent reversal rate for
plaintiffs who appeal defendant pretrial wins. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 111. The
reversal rate from trial wins is 41 percent for defendants when plaintiffs win at trial compared to 9 percent for plaintiffs when the defendant wins at trial. Id. Clermont and Schwab
note that the 41 percent to 9 percent spread in reversal rates is more extreme than the difference between plaintiff and defendant reversal rates in non-job cases. Id. at 111–12.
149 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 130. The plaintiff win rates before juries in other
cases during this time was 44.41 percent. Id. In a study of undergraduates that has implications for jury decisionmaking, Justin D. Levinson found that his participants misremembered
facts in racially biased ways. See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit
Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 398 (2007). The specter of
jury bias has led scholars to argue in favor of juror education about implicit bias. See, e.g.,
Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1276–79 (2002); Levinson, supra at 413–14. Indeed, federal judge
Mark Bennett uses jury instructions on implicit bias in his cases. See Jerry Kang & Kristin
Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465,
500–01 & n.166 (2010) (describing Judge Bennett’s instructions).
150 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 130.
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higher—45.53 percent.151 While the gap between win rates in jury trials versus
bench trials decreased through 2001, the discrepancy began to increase again
after that year.152 Thus, while jurors are not perfect,153 there is something different about the way judges view employment discrimination cases. This has
led Clermont and Schwab to opine that low plaintiff win rates in bench trials
might also explain lower plaintiff win rates in pretrial adjudications—that trial
judges “lean” against plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases in a way
they do not in other cases.154
To use an example from one study in the context of summary judgment,
Professor Joseph Seiner conducted a study of summary judgment motions in all
employment discrimination cases terminated in fiscal year 2006 in which a
defendant made a motion for summary judgment.155 Of the 3,983 summary
judgment orders issued in these cases, courts granted 62.6 percent of the
motions, granted 18.2 percent in part, and denied only 19.2 percent.156 Thus, in
over 80 percent of the cases in which a defendant made such a motion, it was
granted in whole or in part.157 Employment discrimination plaintiffs also do not
151

Id.
See id. at 130 display 16.
153 See generally Levinson, supra note 149.
154 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 131. They also suggest that trial judges may
be disposed against these cases because of the rates of reversals on appeal of judgments for
plaintiffs. See id.
155 See Seiner, supra note 3, at 1033. This data came from the Federal Judicial Center, so
it’s quite inclusive; it does not just include those that were reported either officially or electronically. Id.
156 Id. at 1033 tbl.C.
157 See id. While this study does not provide information about how many defendants in
employment discrimination cases make summary judgment motions, anecdotal as well as
other evidence suggests they are frequent. See, e.g., Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 45, 48 (2005); Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Motions for Summary Judgment When Employers Offer Multiple Justifications for Adverse Employment Actions: Why the Exceptions
Should Swallow the Rule, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 335, 335–36. Professor Vivian Berger, who is
a mediator, has noted that most employers’ counsel state they will file a summary judgment
motion if the case doesn’t settle. Berger et al., supra. Likewise, using data from fiscal year
2006, the Federal Judicial Center took a random sample of 1500 cases from most of the US
district courts. JOE CECIL & GEORGE CORT, THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE ACROSS DISTRICTS WITH VARIATIONS IN LOCAL RULES 4–5
(2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/sujulrs2.pdf.
This study was designed to determine if the manner in which the movant and non-movant
had to proceed with motions for summary judgment, based on local rule, appeared to have an
impact on outcomes of summary judgment motions. It did not include certain types of cases,
such as class actions, and excluded three district courts from which it could not obtain usable
data (Western District of Wisconsin, District of the Northern Marianas Islands, and the District of the Virgin Islands); See id. at 3–4. The Center designed the study to determine the
impact on summary judgment practice in federal courts based on the structure of summary
judgment motions, if any, set out in local rules. The study found that in 35 percent, 34
percent, or 37 percent of employment discrimination cases studied (depending on summary
judgment motion structure), defendants filed at least one summary judgment motion. Id. at
12 tbl.7. The percentage of employment discrimination plaintiffs filing summary judgment
motions was decidedly low—3 percent of employment discrimination cases. Id. at 13 tbl.8.
This is a quite higher percentage of motions in these than other types of cases. For example,
defendants moved for summary judgment in 10 percent, 13 percent, or 14 percent (depend152

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ302.txt

696

unknown

Seq: 24

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

3-JUN-14

10:37

[Vol. 14:673

fare well in the appellate courts, where the reversal rates for judgments in their
favor are much higher than those for judgments in the defendants’ favor.158
Not surprisingly, commentators have suggested that this results from judicial hostility to civil rights cases.159 Indeed, former federal district court Judge
Nancy Gertner described her experience:
Federal courts, I believed, were hostile to discrimination cases. Although the judges
may have thought they were entirely unbiased, the outcomes of those cases told a
different story. The law judges felt “compelled” to apply had become increasingly
problematic. Changes in substantive discrimination law since the passage of the Civil

ing on structure) of contracts cases and 9 percent, 11 percent, or 12 percent (depending on
structure) of torts cases. See id. at 12 tbl.7. Indeed, of the categories of cases studied (contracts, torts, employment discrimination, other civil rights, and other), employment discrimination cases had the highest percentage of defendants filing at least one summary judgment
motion. Id. Not surprisingly, employment discrimination cases also had the highest percentage of such motions being granted in whole or in part. Id. at 16 tbl.11. Depending on the
structure of the summary judgment motion, such motions were granted either 20 percent of
the time or 16 percent of the time. Id. Taking contracts again as point of comparison, such
motions were granted in whole or in part in only 6 percent or 7 percent of cases studied. Id.
Thus, the anecdotal evidence is borne out by this study. Defendants appear to make motions
for summary judgment more often in employment discrimination cases when compared to
other types of civil filings, and courts are granting them. An earlier study by Theodore
Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers attempted to assess if the 1986 summary judgment trilogy
had an effect on summary judgment rates. Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates over Time, Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts 2–3 (Cornell Law Sch., Research Paper No. 08022, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138373. Studying three federal district
courts, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of Georgia, and the Central
District of California, they found a marked increase (nearly doubling) in summary judgment
rates in employment discrimination cases in the Northern District of Georgia. Id. The summary judgment rates in these cases reached approximately 25 percent for cases terminated in
2001–02. Id. at 3. There was not a similar increase for other categories or other districts,
although the rate increased in other civil rights cases in the Northern District of Georgia. The
increase, however, was not statistically significant. Id. at 3, 16.
158 Clermont and Schwab found that the reversal rate for defendants who appeal a plaintiff
victory at trial is 41 percent, whereas the plaintiffs’ reversal rate when they appeal a defendant’s trial victory is 9 percent. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 110 display 2. As they
note, plaintiffs’ chances of retaining a victory on appeal “cannot meaningfully be distinguished from a coin flip,” whereas defendants who prevail at trial “can be assured of retaining that victory after appeal.” Id. at 112. See also Ruth Colker, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 103, 108
(1999) (similar findings in a study of ADA cases). Clermont and Schwab explain that this
discrepancy in reversals after trial on the merits is particularly disturbing because the issues
of intent relevant in these cases usually entail judgments about witness credibility—something appellate courts should not be second-guessing on appeal. Clermont & Schwab, supra
note 3, at 112.
159 See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 113. Clermont and Schwab explain:
“plaintiffs suffer most of the losses at the district court level.” Id. at 109. Further, plaintiffs
in these cases have one of the worst win rates of all civil cases. Id. at 113. Clermont and
Schwab attribute this in part to “attitudinal explanation[s].” Id. at 112. But see Lee Reeves,
Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 482–83 (2008) (arguing that judicial aversion to these claims
is a result of caseload, not ideology).
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Rights Act of 1964 were tantamount to a virtual repeal. This was so not because of
Congress; it was because of judges.160

Gertner posits that judges’ approaches to employment discrimination cases
are skewed by the cases that they see—the cases that do not settle. Because the
best cases settle, judges come to believe that all employment discrimination
cases in front of them are weak, and that there is no significant need for antidiscrimination law.161 This, combined with asymmetric decision-making,
whereby judges write detailed decisions when they grant summary judgment
but do not write opinions when they deny the motions, result in judges adopting
what Gertner characterizes as “Losers’ Rules”—manipulations of the legal
rules essentially to get rid of these cases, whether by using motions to dismiss
or motions for summary judgment.162 Indeed, she relates that in the beginning
of her judicial career, “the trainer teaching discrimination law to new judges
announced, ‘[h]ere’s how to get rid of civil rights cases.’ ”163
Judge Gertner and Melissa Hart take the judicial bias argument one step
further, arguing that bias is reflected in the legal rules developed by the courts
to evaluate and ultimately decide these cases.164 They specifically identify
three commonly used doctrines—stray remarks, honest belief, and same decision-maker—that courts use to undermine the efficacy of plaintiffs’ cases.165
Yet social science suggests that these doctrines are inconsistent with what is
known about how discrimination operates.166 There is a case for judicial bias
playing a role in these cases, which begs the question of why judges and
employers would be biased. Cognitive psychology provides some explanations.
B. The Human Tendency to Bias
Well-intentioned people—including employers and judges—are not free
from bias. There are a variety of psychological phenomena that help account
160 Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 109 (2012) (footnote
omitted).
161 Id. at 111, 114–15.
162 Id. at 110.
163 Id. at 117. I would take her argument one step further. While good cases used to settle,
emboldened by success in motion practice, defense lawyers have stopped trying to settle
cases that formerly would reach early settlement. Indeed, given the prevalence of defendants’ success using summary judgment, defense counsel would be foolish not to attempt a
summary judgment motion. Clermont and Schwab’s research reflects that “employment discrimination plaintiffs manage fewer resolutions early in litigation compared to other plaintiffs, and so they have to proceed toward trial more often. Defendants’ resistance reflects
awareness of their good chances in court.” Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 121.
Whatever the reason, summary judgment is a fruitful avenue for defendants to use to take
these cases out of the court system.
164 See Gertner & Hart, supra note 144, at 90–93.
165 See id.
166 See id.; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 10, at 1034–38 (criticizing honest belief based on
social science), 1042–46, 1051–52 (criticizing same actor doctrine as inconsistent with
social science); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations
After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1314–16 (1998) (discussing the same actor
doctrine); Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains
Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1162–67 (2008)
(discussing the same actor doctrine). Note that the same actor doctrine is also known as the
same decision-maker doctrine.
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for this, including aversive racism, heuristics,167 cognitive biases,168 as well as
motivated cognition,169 to name a few. The purpose of this section is not to
review in detail all the psychological theories and studies that may have an
impact on how women and people of color are perceived; instead, it is to provide enough information about the research to suggest that it may be difficult to
discern on a motion for summary judgment whether an employer discriminated
against an employee. And to show, given evidence of possible judicial bias,
judges are likely not in the best position to be making this decision in the first
instance.
Research on implicit bias suggests that people, in general, are not “colorblind.”170 Instead, people exhibit implicit attitudes in favor of one group over
another based on a variety of factors relevant to anti-discrimination laws,
including race, gender, and religion.171 In addition, people link positive or negative attributes with members of particular groups.172 While reliance on
research based on implicit bias, such as the Implicit Association Test,173 is not
without its detractors,174 the research on the existence of implicit bias is
167 For example, hindsight bias, a type of heuristic or cognitive bias, has been linked to
faulty decision making in sexual harassment cases. See Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence
of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117,
117–18 (2001); see also Guthrie et al., supra note 143, at 784 (describing study of magistrate judges showing that judges are susceptible to common heuristics); Marybeth Herald,
Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias, and Dress Codes, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 299,
306–07 (2007) (discussing representative heuristic); see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET
AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
168 Employment discrimination scholars refer to these phenomena by a variety of names.
See, e.g., Herald, supra note 167, at 304 (“cognitive bias”); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit
Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 427, 429 (2007) (“implicit
biases”); Ann C. McGinley, [¡]Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in
Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 420 (2000) (“unconscious bias”); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 (1993) (referring
to it as “negligent” discrimination); Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation,
and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 542–44 (2003) (examples
of “subtle” discrimination); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose
Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L.
REV. 495, 509 (2001) (“unconscious discrimination”). Implicit bias in particular has received
a lot of scholarly attention recently. See, e.g., Kang & Lane, supra note 149, at 473. For an
excellent sum-up of extant studies available at the time on unconscious race and gender
discrimination, see McGinley, supra, at 421–46.
169 See, e g., Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments—An Analytic
Review, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 307–09 (2013).
170 See Kang & Lane, supra note 149, at 473 (explaining that “[i]mplicit biases—by which
we mean implicit attitudes and stereotypes—are both pervasive (most people show evidence
of some biases), and large in magnitude, statistically speaking. In other words, we are not, on
average or generally, cognitively colorblind”).
171 See id. at 474.
172 See id. at 477.
173 See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014) (listing various Implicit Association Tests).
174 See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock & Gregory Mitchell, Implicit Bias and Accountability Systems: What Must Organizations Do to Prevent Discrimination?, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. 3, 16–18 (2009); see also Kang & Lane, supra note 149, at 504–09 (describing
Mitchell & Tetlock’s criticisms).
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solid.175 Indeed, there are studies that specifically link implicit bias to simulated employment-related decisions.176
In terms of theories that help explain this, aversive racism is helpful in
understanding how well-intentioned people end up discriminating.177 Some
studies show that 80 percent of Western democratic populations display unexamined bias against certain groups even though they believe they have benign
intent with respect to those groups.178 While it is estimated that perhaps 10
percent of the population are blatant biased extremists, most people do not hold
such extreme views.179
In particular, researchers posit that aversive racism affects a majority of
white individuals who state that they are not prejudiced toward black individuals and that they try not to discriminate against minorities.180 Aversive racism
is characterized by feelings of “anxiety and uneasiness” around individuals who
are members of minority groups.181 An aversive racist’s behavior is often
inconsistent (sometimes they discriminate; sometimes they don’t) when dealing
with members of minority groups. As Gaertner and his colleagues explain in
Aversive Racism: Bias Without Intention:
[D]iscrimination will occur in situations in which normative structure is weak, when
the guidelines for appropriate behavior are vague or when the basis for social judgment is ambiguous. In addition, discrimination will occur when an aversive racist can
justify or rationalize a negative response on the basis of some factor other than
race.182
175

See Kang & Lane, supra note 149, at 488–90.
See, e.g., id. at 484–85 (describing studies); Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges,
Employment Discrimination: The Role of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for
Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553 (2005).
177 See Hart, supra note 10, at 747 (noting that aversive racism has implications for employment discrimination law).
178 See Fiske, supra note 17, at 59–60.
179 See id. at 60. Interestingly, these extremists are, as Fiske puts it, “outfront”—”salient,
vocal, and dangerous.” Id. Krieger and Fiske note that more extreme forms of prejudice “do
tend to run in ‘packs,’ ” suggesting that it has a group dynamic to it. Krieger & Fiske, supra
note 10, at 1040. It is noteworthy that employment discrimination law assumes that discriminators are this type of evil actor—that people who engage in such acts have character
flaws—when discrimination really is much more situational. See LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 25–35 (2006); Krieger & Fiske, supra
note 10, at 1039–40; Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13
GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 821 (2005) (arguing that court interpretations of Title VII in the
sexual harassment context assume that harassers are the “one bad apple” at the workplace
instead of looking at workplace situational explanations for the behavior). Krieger and Fiske
note that 9 percent of the variance in a person’s behavior is predicted by stable personality
traits. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 10, at 1048 (citing WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY
AND ASSESSMENT (1968)).
180 Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Aversive Racism: Bias Without Intention, in HANDBOOK OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH, supra note 17, at 377, 378–79. Research on
implicit bias supports the disconnect between a person’s perception of his or her own bias
and his or her actual implicit bias. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 149, at 360–62 (describing
studies); see also Kang & Lane, supra note 149, at 474–75 tbl.1 (showing differences
between IAT results and self-reports).
181 Gaertner et al., supra note 180, at 379; see also Krieger & Fiske, supra note 10, at 1042.
182 Gaertner et al., supra note 180, at 380.
176
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Where right and wrong are clear, Gaertner and his colleagues posit that
aversive racists will not discriminate.183 Many employment decisions are made
under conditions of uncertainty, and the legal standard that employers must
meet under Title VII—the articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason—lends itself to just the type of non-race-based rationalizations characteristic of aversive racism. Similarly, judges make decisions with respect to
summary judgment using vague legal standards.184 They likewise could slip
into the same behaviors.185
Unconscious biases and stereotypes also can play a role in these cases.
Linda Hamilton Krieger examined the role of stereotypes in employment discrimination cases nearly twenty years ago in her influential work, The Content
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Employment Opportunity.186 Krieger set out the extant psychological research on stereotypes explaining how they operate to influence decision making:
Stereotypes are viewed as social schemas or person prototypes. They operate as
implicit expectancies that influence how incoming information is interpreted, the
causes to which events are attributed, and how events are encoded into, retained in,
and retrieved from memory. In other words, stereotypes cause discrimination by biasing how we process information about other people.187

Krieger explained how stereotypes distort perceptions of women and members
of minority groups, and feed into the discrimination they experience in the
workplace.
More recently, Lu-in Wang has explained that many people will not realize they are discriminating because these biases and stereotypes are unconscious or ingrained.188 Once again, decision makers will have a
183 Id. at 379; see also WANG, supra note 179 at 37 (explaining that when what is appropriate in a particular situation is unclear, this tends to increase discrimination or mask it with
reasons other than race).
184 See D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 273,
281–83 (2010) (describing the complexity involved in summary judgment motions); see also
Guthrie et al., supra note 143, at 783 (“[J]udges make decisions under uncertain, time-pressured conditions that encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts that sometimes cause illusions of judgment.”). In an interesting study of decision-making in the discrimination
context, Professors Braman and Nelson found that participants viewed prior cases more
applicable to the case they were asked to consider if it was consistent with their policy
preferences. However, this effect only occurred where the prior precedent was neither clearly
similar nor clearly dissimilar to the scenario the participants were asked to evaluate. See
Eileen Braman & Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanism of Motivated Reasoning? Analogical Perception in Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 940, 949 (2007).
185 Marybeth Herald opines that judges, because of their legal expertise, “are probably more
confident of their abilities to disregard biases than they should be.” Herald, supra note 167,
at 303. Perhaps this explains poor plaintiff win rates in bench trials. See Clermont &
Schwab, supra note 3, at 130–31.
186 See generally Krieger, supra note 10. The early catalyst for this discussion is provided
in Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing the impact of unconscious bias on
antidiscrimination law).
187 Krieger, supra note 10, at 1199.
188 See WANG, supra note 179, at 49–52. Stereotypes are particularly pernicious, because
they “act not only as erroneous judgments of those groups but also lead to the production of
objective facts to support their own accuracy.” Id. at 52. For a recent example in the federal
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nondiscriminatory reason for their actions. This, however, does not mean that
bias did not play a role:
The normative ambiguity studies show that racially biased treatment and legitimate,
nondiscriminatory justifications are likely to coexist in many cases. More specifically, they show that the existence of a legitimate justification for a negative decision
does not necessarily discredit racial bias as an explanation for that decision. The
presence of such a justification may, instead, be cause to suspect that the decision in
fact was racially biased, because racial discrimination today seems most likely to
occur through the racially biased application of a nondiscriminatory reason.189

This would make evidence of comparators who were treated better than members of traditionally discriminated-against groups particularly important in any
legal analysis.190
IV. MODERN PROOF

OF

DISCRIMINATION

AND

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

When people are not conscious of their biases, it is difficult to show that
discrimination is intentional in the legal sense that courts are using intent.
Given that discrimination based on race, sex, religion, and other protected characteristics is considered socially unacceptable in our society, most people
would not admit to such biases even if they were aware of them.191 This
requires one to infer the intent of the actor. Interestingly, early Title VII case
law accounts for this in the McDonnell Douglas standard, which provides that a
plaintiff need only show that she was a member of a protected class, was qualified for the job, was turned down for the job, and the position remained open or
was filled by someone else.192 The Court’s mechanism for inferring intent
assumes that discrimination is a common operating procedure. Absent the two
most common reasons for not getting a job—it was unavailable or the candidate did not have the appropriate qualifications—one can assume discrimination played a role. Of course, the light burden that the employer must meet in
courts of appeals, see Stephanie Condon, Conservative Judge Edith Jones Up for Rare
Review, CBS NEWS (June 13, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/conservative
-judge-edith-jones-up-for-rare-review/ (recounting that judge was referred by Chief Justice
Roberts for investigation based on allegations that “she called certain racial groups like African-Americans and Hispanics ‘predisposed to crime’ and called defendants’ claims of racism
nothing more than ‘red herrings.’ ”); Janet Elliott, Judge Says Bias Suits Undermine Rule of
Law, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 31, 2001, at 2 (quoting Judge Jones as stating that employment
discrimination cases “ ‘seldom turn on evidence of race- or sex-based discrimination’ but
more likely involve ‘petty interoffice disputes, recrimination, second-guessing and
suspicion’ ”).
189 WANG, supra note 179, at 44 (emphasis in original).
190 But there are currently problems with case law involving comparators. Courts have been
too stringent in who they will permit plaintiffs to use as comparators. See generally Tricia
M. Beckles, Comment, Class of One: Are Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs at an Insurmountable Disadvantage If They Have No “Similarly Situated” Comparators?, 10 U. PA. J.
BUS. & EMP. L. 459 (2008); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191 (2009) (noting problems with comparators in court and suggesting a solution).
191 See Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in
Stereotyping and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 253, 274 (James S. Uleman & John
A. Bargh eds., 1989).
192 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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response—the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason—greatly undermines the
efficacy of this assumption in actual litigation. Given the prevalence of unconscious bias, the Court was on the correct track in inferring intent from such
simple circumstances.
In recent years, courts have increasingly adopted a narrow view of discrimination. Modern antidiscrimination law emphasizes “discrimination as a
wrong perpetrated by a discriminator who acts self-consciously and irrationally.”193 As Gertner and Hart point out, “[b]oth the legal doctrine and its application by trial and appellate judges reflect the often unrealistic search for a
rogue, guilty decision-maker in the workplace, whose biases are overt. Anything short of that—any more subtle form of discrimination—will not pass
muster.”194 Indeed, even when courts acknowledge that unconscious discrimination might have played a role in a particular case, they are compelled to
decide summary judgment motions in favor of the defendant given the legal
standards currently in use.195
When it comes to discrimination, what we know about human behavior
makes this unfortunate phenomenon all too common. Krieger and Fiske provide excellent links:
Several . . . meta-analyses have been done on phenomena pertaining to prejudice and
discrimination. Stronger field than laboratory effects have demonstrated the real
world generality of favoring members of one’s ingroup, remembering stereotypic
more than counterstereotypic information, judging the outgroup as more homogeneous than the ingroup, and liking people one sees frequently.196
193

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 477, 480 (2007).
194 Gertner & Hart, supra note 144, at 81.
195 A telling example of this is Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303
(M.D. Ala. 2004). In this case, an African American candidate for a school superintendent
position sued when a white applicant got the job. Id. at 1306. While the trial court granted
the motion for summary judgment, holding that the school district decisionmakers “honestly” believed that the candidate they chose was better for the job, see id. at 1309, the trial
judge believed that unconscious bias might have played a role, given the subjective nature of
the decision. The judge explained:
Such subjective decision-making processes are particularly susceptible to being influenced not
by overt bigotry and hatred, but rather by unexamined assumptions about others that the decisionmaker may not even be aware of—hence the difficulty of ferreting out discrimination as a
motivating factor. “Thus,” Professor Lawrence explains, “an individual may select a white job
applicant over an equally qualified black and honestly believe that this decision was based on
observed intangibles unrelated to race. The employer perceives the white candidate as ‘more
articulate,’ ‘more collegial,’ ‘more thoughtful,’ or ‘more charismatic.’ He is unaware of the
learned stereotype that influenced his decision. Moreover, he has probably also learned an
explicit lesson of which he is very much aware: Good, law-abiding people do not judge others on
the basis of race. Even the most thorough investigation of conscious motive will not uncover the
race-based stereotype that has influenced his decision.”

Id. (quoting Lawrence, supra note 186, at 324–25). For a detailed analysis of the Troy case
in light of unconscious bias, see generally Hart, supra note 10.
196 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 10, at 1023 (footnotes omitted). Preferences for in-group
members tend to run in favor of socially dominant groups. In other words, people from
minority groups tend to implicitly favor those of more socially dominant groups. See, e.g.,
Kang & Lane, supra note 149, at 476 (“[T]hose who belong to social groups deemed to be
‘good’ . . . show strong preference for their own group. On the other hand, those who come
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Yet, disparate treatment theory as seen through the lens of summary judgment
continues to rely on the assumption of transparent mental processes.197
Krieger and Fiske specifically have made the case that judges should have
difficulty granting summary judgment in employment discrimination because
of what social science tells us about how discrimination operates. Krieger and
Fiske argue that judges already use models of how people behave in assessing
employment discrimination claims.198 This is especially so when it comes to
drawing inferences about discrimination. As they explain:
In the adjudication of summary judgment motions, judges use implicit theories of
human behavior to determine, among other things, what inferences would be “reasonable” or “unreasonable” to draw from a particular factual pattern, since only “reasonable” inferences need be drawn in favor of the non-moving party (usually the
plaintiff) and against the moving party (usually the defendant).199

Using theories of human behavior helps inform what are and are not “reasonable” inferences from a given set of factual circumstances. Krieger and Fiske
advocate for providing jurors with this information to help them decide.200
Both judges and jurors will employ their own theories. Why not assist them
with theories that have empirical support?
Krieger and Fiske’s position is bolstered by the dissent in Torgerson. The
dissent in Torgerson agreed that there was no “special” summary judgment
standard for employment discrimination, but disagreed with the majority that
summary judgment was appropriate in that case.201 Somewhat ironically, in its
analysis of why summary judgment was improper, it highlighted why caution is
appropriate in granting summary judgment where intent is at issue.
The Torgerson plaintiffs sought jobs as firefighters with the city of Rochester, Minnesota. One piece of evidence suggesting that the city’s legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiffs was actually pretextual
was a statement made by a Fire Commissioner that a fact finder could construe
as evidence of discrimination. The positions the plaintiffs applied for were
funded by a federal grant that expressed a preference for women and members
of minority groups. The Commissioner remarked that he “would have recommended that the City not take the grant” if he had known about the preference.202 The dissent explained its disagreement with the majority’s
interpretation of this comment:
The court usurps the jury’s function by construing this comment in the light most
favorable to the City, not [plaintiffs] Torgerson and Mundell. The court interprets
Commissioner Field’s comment as nondiscriminatory because “Congress explicitly
commands that Title VII shall not be interpreted to require preferential treatment
because of sex or national origin on account of an imbalance in the number or percent of those employed, compared to the relevant number of percent in the commufrom groups that the culture assigns as ‘bad’ . . . do not show strong ingroup preference.”);
Levinson, supra note 149, at 362–63 (citing studies).
197 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 10, at 1030.
198 Id. at 1006.
199 Id. at 1013.
200 Id.
201 Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2011) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
202 Id. at 1056.
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nity.” Thus, according to the court, Commissioner Field’s comment must be
interpreted as merely evidencing his disagreement with the mandatory hiring of persons based on their sex or national origin. That may well be what he intended, but a
reasonable jury with the benefit of cross-examined testimony from Commissioner
Field could also interpret the comment as indicating that Commissioner Field was
opposed to hiring women and minorities under any circumstances, mandatory or otherwise. Ultimately, a jury—not this court—should determine Commissioner Field’s
intended meaning. Delving into Commissioner Field’s thought processes and
explaining away his comment so as to avoid any inference of discriminatory animus
is inappropriate and in direct conflict with the summary judgment standard.203

While the Torgerson dissent may have eschewed the “special” standard for
intent cases, it provided an example of why it is so difficult to determine issues
of intent on a dry record. In this case, the comment by Commissioner Field was
a key piece of evidence suggesting intentional discrimination by a decision
maker. Yet, the statement was in some ways ambiguous. Was Commissioner
Field objecting to hiring any women or members of other national origin
groups or to mandatory hiring quotas for these groups? A fact finder could infer
a discriminatory motive from the Commissioner’s statement and certainly
would benefit from Commissioner Field’s own explanation for his statement in
open court, subject to cross-examination, to determine his intent. It is because
intent cases often involve fact patterns like this that makes them well suited for
the fact finder and not so well suited for summary judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
One need not read all of the voluminous research committed to unconscious bias to realize that determining an employer’s intent on a motion for
summary judgment might be a difficult decision for a judge to make. Indeed,
there is some reason to believe that judges might have their own sets of biases
that are implicated in employment discrimination cases, making the possibility
of a judge rendering an unbiased decision in these cases even more suspect.
Yet, lower court rhetoric, thanks to cases like Torgerson, makes it increasingly
easy for courts to grant such motions. The psychology of bias suggests that the
courts are acting too soon. Until legal rules and decision-making processes
incorporate what is known about implicit bias and other common human characteristics that lead people to discriminate, courts should be reluctant to grant
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.

203 Id. (citations omitted) (citing Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376–77 (8th Cir.
1996)) (reh’g denied).

